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Abstract
This paper provides, from a theoretical and quantitative point of view, an explanation
of why taxes on capital returns are high by analyzing the optimal Þscal policy in an econ-
omy with intergenerational redistribution. For this purpose, the government is modeled
explicitly and can choose (and commit to) an optimal tax policy in order to maximize
societys welfare. In an inÞnitely lived economy with heterogeneous agents, the long run
optimal capital tax is zero. If heterogeneity is due to the existence of overlapping gener-
ations, this result in general is no longer true. I provide a suﬃcient conditions for zero
capital, and show that a general class of preferences, commonly used in the macro and
public Þnance literature, violate this condition. For a version of the model, calibrated to
the US economy, the main results are: Þrst, if the government is restricted to use pro-
portional taxes across generations, the model can account for the observed capital and
labor income taxes. Second, if the government can use speciÞc taxes for each generation,
then the age proÞle capital tax pattern implies subsidizing asset returns of the younger
generations and taxing at higher rates the asset returns of the older ones.
Keywords: Optimal taxation.
J.E.L. classiÞcation codes: E62, H21.
∗I want to thank the useful comments of Pat Kehoe, Juan Carlos Conesa, Antonio Manresa,
Begoña Dominguez, Tim Kehoe, Tim Salmon, Jim Cobbe and seminar participants at the 2000
Meeting of the Society for Economic Dynamics, the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Uni-
versity of Texas-Austin and Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. I also acknowledge the Þnancial
support of DGCYT PB96-0988 from Ministerio de Educación y Cultura and SGR97-180 from the
Generalitat de Catalunya. Correspondence: Departament of Economics, Florida State Univer-
sity, 246 Bellamy, Tallahassee, Florida 32306-2180 (USA). E-mail: cgarriga@garnet.acns.fsu.edu
1
1 Introduction
The standard view of economists is that capital returns should not be taxed at all.
In Lucas words: I believed that the single most desirable change in the U.S. tax
structure would be the taxation of capital gains as ordinary income. I now believe
that neither capital gains nor any source of income from capital should be taxed
at all. My earlier view was based on what I viewed as the best available economic
analysis, but of course I think my current view is based on a better economic
analysis, (Lucas (1990)).
This view is built on a well-established theory of optimal Þscal policy. In
standard neoclassical growth models, with inÞnitely-lived consumers, the optimal
policy predicts that capital taxes should be zero in the long run and important
welfare gains can be realized by implementing this policy. This result was Þrst
shown by Chamley (1986). Several papers have extended this result to more com-
plex economies that include heterogeneous consumers (Judd (1985)), endogenous
growth (Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1997)), aggregate shocks (Chari, Christiano
and Kehoe (1994)), and open economies (Razin and Sandka (1995)). In each case
the result is the same, capital returns should not be taxed at all.
However the observed data for most OECD economies show that capital taxes
are diﬀerent from zero. For instance in the US the average capital tax over the
period 1965−1995 is around 35%, and in the U.K and Germany it is around 37%
and 23.5% respectively.
At this point theory and data seem to be mutually exclusive. Why might
governments choose to tax capital returns at high rates? Can we Þnd a model
where the optimal policy implies capital taxes diﬀerent from zero? Is this model
consistent with the observed capital taxation?
The main contribution of this paper is to show that when we consider a Þnite
lifetime economy, in the tradition of Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987), for the class
of utility functions commonly used in the macro and public Þnance literature the
optimal policy implies a tax rate on capital returns diﬀerent from zero. Moreover,
for some plausible choices of parameter values the optimal policy is consistent
with the average capital taxes observed for most OECD countries.
This result contrasts with previous results in the extensive literature on op-
timal Þscal policy in overlapping generations economies, for example Pestieau
(1974), Atkinson and Sandmo (1980), Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), and more re-
cently Chari and Kehoe (1999). These papers focus their analysis on the steady
state and Þnd restrictive conditions for zero capital taxes in the long run. These
conditions cannot be extended to economies where agents live more than two
periods.
This result together with the standard results in inÞnite-lived consumers mod-
els suggested other explanations to account for the observed high capital taxation:
incomplete markets (Aiyagari (1995) and Domeij and Heathcote (2000)), time
consistency issues (Klein and Rios-Rull (2000) and Phelan and Stachetti (2001)),
or information problems (Golosov, Kocherlakota and Tsyvinski (2001)). One of
the main problems in these papers is that Þscal policy plays two roles: Þnance
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government expenditure and substitute for missing markets (insurance, lack of
commitment or information problems). This raises the question why the govern-
ment cannot implement some other type of policy to achieve this goal, and set
capital taxes to zero. In this paper markets are complete, and the focus is on the
distortions due to taxation.
This paper provides theoretical foundations as well as quantitative results for
the optimal Þscal policy in Þnite lifetime environments. The main theoretical
result is that the optimal tax on capital returns is in general diﬀerent from zero,
both in the transition path and in the long run. I provide a suﬃcient condition
for the zero capital tax result and show that a general class of preferences violates
this condition.
To provide some intuition it is useful to compare this result with the optimal
policy in an inÞnitely-lived consumers economy. In a dynamic economy there is
certain equivalence between tax instruments. For example, a tax system that
uses positive capital taxes to Þnance government expenditure is equivalent to a
tax system that uses an ever-increasing consumption tax and an increasing labor
subsidy. In an inÞnitely-lived consumer economy, if preferences are separable and
exhibit some degree of substitutability, an increasing consumption tax creates an
important distortion on the relative price between todays consumption and con-
sumption at period T . Then given that individuals want to smooth consumption,
they prefer a constant consumption tax than an ever-increasing consumption tax.
In contrast, if individuals live a Þnite number of periods, as in an overlap-
ping generations model, the distortions associated with this policy are not that
important because for a given generation todays consumption and period T con-
sumption are not perfectly substitutable. Hence the eﬀect of capital distortions is
much smaller and not necessarily bigger than distortions caused by other taxes.
In general taxes on capital returns are diﬀerent from zero unless we make some
assumption either on the lifetime horizon or on the set of instruments available to
the government. The optimal capital tax can be zero if we consider either a two
period OG model where the old generation does not supply labor (this is the stan-
dard framework used in the referenced literature1), or the government is allowed
to use age-dependent taxes. In these two cases the uniform tax property ensures
zero capital taxes, both in the transition path and in the long run. Restrictions
on the set of tax instruments that the government can use play an important
role in the determination of the optimal policy. This point is emphasized in the
quantitative results.
For a version of the model calibrated to the US economy the key Þndings are:
Þrst, if the government uses proportional taxes across ages, the optimal capital tax
is as high as in the US economy. Second, if the government can use age-dependent
1In a simple two period model, where only the young generations supply labor, the standard
assumption for the set of Þscal instruments available implies that labor income tax aﬀects young
generations while capital taxes aﬀect old generations in the economy. Therefore, under certain
assumptions on the utility function (satisfy unitary expenditure elasticity), it can be shown that
cumulative distortions of the capital income taxes on the intertemporal decisions make young
generations prefer a static distortion due to labor taxes. If we allow generations to work in all
periods, then the previous result is no longer true even with the same type of preferences.
3
proportional taxes, then the age proÞle capital tax pattern implies a subsidy on
the asset returns of the younger generations and a tax on the asset holdings of
the older ones. Hence, constraints on the set of instruments that the government
can use are quantitatively too important to be ignored.
At this point two papers deserve special comments. Escolano (1992) showed,
using a quantitative analysis, that in overlapping generations economies, positive
capital taxes can be optimal and the eﬃciency loss of the current Þscal system
in the US economy is not quantitatively relevant. In his model for a particular
value of the government discount factor, the optimal tax on capital returns is zero.
This paper has two shortcomings, Þrst it does not derive suﬃcient conditions to
check whether this is a general result or not. Second, the quantitative exercise
implies that the government only has access to proportional taxes across ages.
Independent work by Erosa and Gervais (2000) considers a similar economy and
derives some of the results presented here for the case of age-dependent taxes.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the environment and
deÞnes a competitive equilibrium, and section 3 deÞnes the government problem
and derives suﬃcient conditions for the zero capital tax result. Section 4 describes
the calibration process and the main quantitative Þndings under diﬀerent tax
arrangements. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 The economy
The model is a standard overlapping generations production economy with two
goods, a consumption-capital good and labor. Agents live I ≥ 2 periods and
each cohort is populated by a continuum of identical households, represented by
the interval [0, 1]. Without loss of generality, the population is assumed to be
stationary and its total size is constant.2
There is a representative Þrm that produces aggregate output Yt using a
constant returns to scale production function F (Kt, Lt), using aggregate cap-
ital Kt and aggregate labor Lt as primary inputs. Labor is measured in ef-
Þciency units. The production function F : R2+ → R+ is strictly concave,
monotone, homogeneous of degree one and continuously diﬀerentiable, with par-
tial derivatives F1(Kt, Lt) > 0 and F2(Kt, Lt) > 0. Furthermore for all K,L ∈ R2+
F (0, L) = F (K, 0) = 0. Capital depreciates each period at a constant rate
δ ∈ (0, 1) and there is no exogenous technological change. These assumptions
imply that in competitive factor markets Þrms will make zero proÞts, hence it is
unnecessary to specify Þrms ownership. Then, each period prices are determined
by the marginal products, that is
rt = F1(Kt, Lt)− δ, (1)
wt = F2(Kt, Lt), (2)
where rt denotes the interest rate net of depreciation and wt is the wage rate per
eﬃciency unit of labor. Let Ct and Lt denote aggregate consumption and labor
2This is not an important assumption for the basic results and simpliÞes notation.
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respectively
Ct =
XI
i=1
cit ∀t, (3)
Lt =
XI
i=1
²i`it ∀t, (4)
where cit denotes consumption of an individual of age i at time t, ²
i denote her
eﬃciency units, and `it is hours worked.
The government in this economy Þnances an exogenous sequence of expendi-
ture {G}∞t=0 using proportional capital taxes θt, labor taxes τ t and debt Dt. The
government intertemporal budget constraint is
Gt +RtDt ≤ τ twtLt + θtrtKt +Dt+1 ∀t, (5)
where Rt denotes the return on government debt.3 Let π = {τ `t , θt}∞t=0 be a tax
policy consisting of an inÞnite sequence of proportional taxes. Notice that the
government debt has not been included as part of the policy. Given the initial
government debt D0 and the sequence {G}∞t=0, we can back up the sequence of
debt {D}∞t=1.
The economy resource constraint at each time t is given by
Ct +Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt +Gt ≤ F (Kt, Lt) ∀t. (6)
Households in this economy have standard preferences deÞned over a stream of
consumption and labor {cit, `it}∞t=0, and are represented by a time separable utility
function XI
i=1
βi−1U(cit, `
i
t) ∀t, (7)
where β > 0 is the subjective discount factor. The utility function U : R2+ → R+
is C2, strictly concave, increasing in consumption Uc(cit, `
i
t) > 0, decreasing in
labor U`(cit, `
i
t) < 0. The agents are endowed at each period with a time invariant
vector of eﬃciency units of labor ² = (²1, ..., ²I). One unit of time of an individual
of age i can be transformed into ²i units of input in the production function. At
each period, taking prices and taxes as given, individuals choose consumption,
labor supply, and asset holdings. Households decisions face a sequence of budget
and non-negativity constraints:
cit + a
i+1
t+1 ≤ (1− τ t)wt²i`it + (1 + rt(1− θt))ait 1 ≤ i ≤ I ∀t, (8)
a1t = 0, 0 ≤ `it ≤ 1, cit ≥ 0 ∀t.
Households are born with zero assets and accumulate wealth ai+1t+1 in three forms:
buying government debt of one period maturity and lending to households or
Þrms. Government debt and capital are perfect substitutes for the individual
investment decisions.
3Without loss of generality I have abstracted from consumption taxes, because in this model
they are redundant.
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At the initial period, t = 0, the stock of capital and debt is distributed among
the initial, s, generations (individuals of age 2 to I). Let as0 be the initial endow-
ment of wealth of generation s. The period 0 budget constraint is given by
cs0 + a
s+1
1 ≤ (1− τ0)w0²s`s0 + (1 + r0(1− θ0))as0 2 ≤ s ≤ I, (9)
Intertemporal trade between generations to smooth consumption over the life-
cycle is allowed. 4 Market clearing conditions in the capital markets imply:
Kt+1 =
XI
i=1
ait+1 −Dt+1 ∀t, (10)
Next we proceed by deÞning the notion of competitive equilibrium.
DeÞnition 1 (Competitive Equilibrium): Given a tax policy π and a se-
quence of government expenditure {Gt}∞t=0, a competitive equilibrium in this econ-
omy is a sequence of individual allocations {{cit, `it, ait+1}Ii=1}∞t=0, production plans
{Kt, Lt}∞t=0, government debt {Dt+1}∞t=0, and relative prices {rt, wt, Rt}∞t=0, such
that:
1. Consumers born at time t ≥ 1 maximize (7) subject to (8). Similarly consumers
born at t ≤ 0 maximize utility subject to (9).
2. In the production sector (1) and (2) are satisÞed for all t.
3. Factor markets clear and (4) and (10) hold.
4. The government budget constraint (5) is satisÞed.
5. Feasibility (6) is satisÞed for all t.
3 Government problem
Lets consider the policy problem faced by the government. Suppose that there
exists a benevolent government that chooses the optimal policy π∗, to maximize
the welfare of all (present and future) generations subject to given constraints.
These constraints imply that the present value government budget constraint must
be satisÞed and the allocation associated with the optimal policy has to belong
to the subset of policies for which a competitive equilibrium exists.
The optimal Þscal policy might cause time-consistency problems because the
government might have incentives to deviate from the optimal policy once it has
been announced and taken into account by the agents. This time-consistency
issue has been shown in Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Calvo (1978). In this
paper we abstract from these issues and it is assumed that the government can
4This assumption implies that credit markets are complete, in the sense that agents are not
credit constrained. Aiyagari (1995) shows that in an economy with incomplete markets the
optimal capital tax is positive. The basic intuition works as follows. Because of the incom-
plete insurance markets, there is a precautionary motive for accumulating capital. In addition,
the possibility of being borrowing constrained in the future leads to some additional savings.
These facts increase the capital stock. Then, a positive capital tax is needed to reduce capital
accumulation and equalize the interest rate of the economy to the rate of time preference.
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commit to future policies. This commitment technology is modelled in the timing
of the decisions and it works as follows: Þrst the government chooses a policy π
at time zero, second agents choose optimal allocations taking as given the policy
and prices.5
The government is benevolent and values all present and future generations
in the economy. The government objective function is deÞned as a weighted sum
of each generations lifetime utility6. Therefore the government assigns a non-
negative weight to all individuals when born. Let ωt ∈ R+ be the relative weight
of a generation born at time t. The sequence of weights {ωt}∞t=−(I−1) is bounded
above by a large positive constant Γ < ∞. Formally the government objective
function is
W ({cit, lit}) =
X∞
t=0
XI
i=1
ωt+1−i
³
βi−1U(cit, l
i
t)
´
. (11)
To Þnd an asymptotic steady state for the government problem it is convenient
to impose some structure on the sequence of weights7, such as
lim
t→∞
ωt
ωt+1
=
1
λ
> 1.
where λ can be view as a subjective valuation of present and future generations.
If the government valuation of future generations is high, then λ is close to one.
The government problem of choosing the optimal policy is solved using the
so-called primal approach, as in Lucas and Stokey (1983) and Chari and Ke-
hoe (1999). One way to think of it is having the government choosing directly
from the set of implementable allocations given a tax policy π. Then from the
allocations it is possible to back out policies and prices from the competitive
equilibrium. The set of implementable allocations is characterized by the period
resource constraint and an implementability constraint for each generation. The
implementability constraint takes into account that changes in the policy will
aﬀect agents decisions, therefore prices and government revenues. These con-
straints are constructed by substituting the households budget constraints, and
Þrms Þrst-order conditions, into the households decision rules. The next propo-
sition shows how to characterize the set of implementable allocations for a given
class of policy π.
Proposition 1 (Set of Implementable Allocations): Given a tax policy π any
competitive equilibrium allocation x = {{cit, lit}Ii=1,Kt+1}∞t=0 satisÞes the period
resource constraint:XI
i=1
cit +Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt +Gt = F (Kt,
XI
i=1
²i`it) ∀t, (12)
5If a commitment technology is not available there are two ways to go, one is to Þnd mecha-
nisms that substitute for commitment as in Chari and Kehoe (1990) or Stokey (1991), or solve the
case where neither commitment or reputation mechanism are operative as in Klein and Ríos-Rull
(1999) or Phelan and Stacchetti (1999).
6In the early literature, see Samuelson (1958) or Diamond (1965), societys welfare was rep-
resented by the utility of a representative generation in steady state.
7Atkinson and Sandmo (1980) derive, using the so-called dual approach, the optimal capital
tax in the steady state for diﬀerent government discount factors. It can be easily shown that all
are particular cases of this formulation.
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implementability constraints for all newborn generations:XI
i=1
βi−1
³
cit+i−1Ucit+i−1 + `
i
t+i−1U`it+i−1
´
= 0 t ≥ 0, (13)
implementability constraints for the initial old generations at t = 0:XI
i=s
βi−s
³
cii−sUcii−s + `
i
i−sU`ii−s
´
= Ucs0a
s
0 s = 2, ..., I, (14)
marginal rates of substitution between consumption and labor, and consumption
today and tomorrow are equal across consumers:
Uc1t
Ul1t
²1 = . . . =
UcIt
UlIt
²I ∀t, i, (15)
Uc1t
Uc2t+1
= . . . =
UcI−1t
UcIt+1
∀t, i. (16)
Furthermore, given allocations that satisÞes (12), (13), (14), (15), and (16), we
can construct a tax policy π = {τ t, θt}∞t=0, a sequence of government debt {Dt}∞t=0
and relative prices {rt, wt, Rt}∞t=0, that together with the allocation x, constitute
a competitive equilibrium.
Proof. We Þrst proceed by showing that the allocations in a competitive equilib-
rium must satisfy (12), (13), (14), (15), and (16). Condition (12) is straightforward
from substituting the labor market clearing condition (4) into (6). To derive the
implementability constraint for each generation we have to use the Þrst-order
conditions of the consumers problem
βiUcit = α
i
t ∀t, i, (17)
βiUlit
= −αit(1− τ t)wt²i ∀t, i, (18)
αit = α
i+1
t+1 [1 + rt+1(1− θt+1)] ∀t, i, (19)
where αit denotes the Lagrange multiplier of age i budget constraint. To derive
the implementability constraint we have to multiply (17), (18) by their respective
control variables and then add them up for all i. Then substituting in the re-
sulting expression the households budget constraint and using (19) we derive the
implementability constraint for the newborn generations (13). For the initial gen-
erations in the economy at time t = 0 the distribution of asset holdings appears
on the right hand side of (14).
If the government is restricted to use the same proportional taxes for all gen-
erations the set of implementable allocations needs to include constraints (15),
and (16).
Now we prove the second part of Proposition 1. From the aggregate capital
stock, Kt, and the aggregate labor supply, Lt, we construct the relative prices
using the Þrms Þrst-order conditions (1) and (2).
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To derive the policy π = {τ t, θt}∞t=0 we substitute the allocations {{cit, lit}Ii=1}∞t=0
and the equilibrium prices {rt, wt, }∞t=0 into households Þrst-order conditions as
follows
1− τ t = −
Ulit
Ucit²
iFLt
∀t, i, (20)
1− θt+1 = 1
FKt − δ
 Ucit
βUci+1t+1
− 1
 ∀t, i. (21)
The tax rates are set to satisfy the consumers Þrst-order conditions. The return
on debt holdings for all t is determined by an arbitrage argument, Rt = 1 +
rt(1 − θt). Substituting Ucit and U`it from the consumers problem into (13), (14)
we obtain the intertemporal budget constraint of each household (for simplicity
written in Arrow-Debreu terms):XI−1
i=0
pt+i
h
cit+i − (1− τ t+i)wt+i²i`it+i
i
= 0 ∀i. (22)
The sequence of government debt {Dt}∞t=0 is adjusted to satisfy the desired
capital-output ratio, and is obtained using market clearing in the capital market
Dt+1 =
XI
i=1
ait+1 −Kt+1. (23)
This expression does not impose any restrictions on the sign of the government
debt, therefore it might be negative. If feasibility and the households budget
constraint are satisÞed, then the government budget constraint is also satisÞed.
It is important to note that if an allocation x = {{cit, lit}Ii=1,Kt+1}∞t=0 satis-
Þes feasibility and each generations implementability constraint, that does not
imply that the marginal rates of substitution across consumers are equal. To
see this, suppose that the government can use age-dependent taxes, that is πi =
{{τ it, θit}Ii=1}∞t=0, then if an allocation x satisÞes feasibility and the implementabil-
ity constraint, the marginal rates of substitution do not need to be equal across
generations at a given point in time. The constraints in the set of taxes that the
government can use will play an important role to determine the optimal Þscal
policy but are often not considered.
In a representative agent economy, the government has incentives to tax heav-
ily the initial stock of capital. To avoid this problem it is commonly assumed that
the government takes as given the initial capital tax. In this type of economy the
government faces an inÞnite sequence of implementability constraints, because
the economy is populated over time by an inÞnite number of individual that live
a Þnite number of periods. Then, taxing the initial distribution of asset holdings
{as0}Is=0 is equivalent to tax an inelastically supplied factor and has intergenera-
tional redistributive eﬀects, therefore it is assumed that the government takes as
given the initial capital tax {θ0}. Dropping this assumption does not aﬀect the
main results of the paper because capital taxes at t = 0 cannot be used to mimic
lump-sum taxes beyond t = 1.
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The governments optimal taxation problem is to choose x from the set of im-
plementable allocations such that the utilitarian objective function is maximized.
Formally the Ramsey allocation problem is,
max
{{cit,`it}Ii=1,Kt+1}∞t=0
X∞
t=0
XI
i=1
ωt+1−i
h
βi−1U(cit, `
i
t)
i
, (24)
s.t.
XI
i=1
cit +Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt +Gt = F (Kt,
XI
i=1
²i`it) ∀t, (25)XI
i=1
βi−1
³
cit+i−1Ucit+i−1 + `
i
t+i−1U`it+i−1
´
= 0 t ≥ 0, (26)XI
i=s
βi−s
³
cii−sUcii−s + `
i
i−sU`ii−s
´
= Ucs0a
s
0 s = 2, ..., I, (27)
Ucit
Uci+1t+1
= ... =
UcI−1t
UcIt+1
∀t, i = 1, ..., I, (28)
Uc1t
U`1t
²1 = ... =
UcIt
U`It
²I ∀t, i = 1, ..., I. (29)
where the initial distribution of wealth as,0, K0 = K > 0 and {Gt}∞t=0 are given
and cit ≥ 0, `it ∈ (0, 1).
The allocation x that solves the Ramsey allocation problem is constrained
eﬃcient, in the sense that there exists no other constrained eﬃcient allocation x0
that Pareto dominates the optimal.
To solve the government problem I follow a particular approach assuming that
the government has access to a complete set of age-dependent taxes (that is drop-
ping the additional constraints on the marginal rates of substitution), and then
verify under what conditions capital taxes will be zero. If capital taxes are not
zero in the less constrained problem, then we cannot expect them to be zero for
the age-independent tax case. Then, it is useful to redeÞne the objective function
by introducing the implementability constraint on it, and use the associated La-
grange multiplier as co-state variable. Let ηt−i be the Lagrange multiplier of the
implementability constraint for the agent born in period t− i. Lets deÞne
V (cit, `
i
t, ηt−i) = U(c
i
t, `
i
t) + ηt−i(c
i
tUcit + `
i
tU`it). (30)
The modiÞed Ramsey Allocation Problem can be written as follows:
max
{{cit,`it}Ii=1,Kt+1}∞t=0
X∞
t=0
XI
i=1
ωt+1−i
h
βi−1V (cit, `
i
t, ηt−i)
i
−
XI
s=2
η1−sUcs0a
s
0,
(31)
s.t.
XI
i=1
cit +Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt +Gt = F (Kt,
XI
i=1
²i`it) ∀t. (32)
This problem has a similar structure to an optimal planning problem, except
that the period utility function U(·) has been replaced by a pseudo utility func-
tion V (·). If the government has access to lump-sum taxes, the implementability
constraint will not be binding, ηt−i = 0, and it will not be optimal to use distor-
tionary taxes and the economy would achieve a full eﬃcient allocation. Let µt be
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the Lagrange multiplier of the resource constraint, then the Þrst-order necessary
conditions at t > 0 are deÞned by
[cit] ωt+1−iβ
i−1Vcit − µt = 0,
[ci+1t ] ωt−iβ
iVci+1t
− µt = 0,
[`it] ωt+1−iβ
i−1V`it + µtFLt²
i = 0,
[Kt+1] −µt + µt+1(1− δ + FKt) = 0,
together with the transversality condition for the optimal capital path:
lim
t→∞µtKt+1 = 0. (33)
Throughout the paper I assume that the solution of the Ramsey allocation prob-
lem exists and that the time paths of the solutions converge to a steady state.
Neither of these assumptions is innocuous. Notice that since the set of alloca-
tions that satisfy the implementability constraint might fail to be convex, the
Þrst-order conditions are necessary but not suﬃcient (for a detailed discussion of
nonconvexities, see Lucas and Stokey (1983)). Rearranging terms, we have:
ωt+1−iVcit = ωt+2−iVcit+1(1− δ + FKt+1) ∀i, t, (34)
V`it
Vcit
= −FLt²i ∀i, t, (35)
Vcit =
ωt−i
ωt+1−i
βVci+1t
, ∀i, t. (36)
Notice that Equation (34) is slightly diﬀerent from the competitive equilib-
rium Euler equation. In this case the government equates the derivative of the
objective function of a newborn generation at diﬀerent times. Equation (35) is
the intratemporal condition between consumption and labor, that determines the
amount of eﬀective hours worked by each generation at a given period t. Finally,
equation (36) is the static redistributive condition, and implies that the govern-
ment will assign consumption among two diﬀerent generations according to the
ratio of their relative weights.
For the initial s generations at t = 0, the Þrst-order necessary conditions are
diﬀerent from the previous ones, given the initial distribution of asset holdings.
The Þrst-order condition with respect to consumption-labor is given by
V`s0 − η1−s
h
Ucs0`s0 ((1 + FK0(1− θs0)as0) + Ucs0FK0`s0(1− θs0)as0
i
Vcs0 − η1−sUcs0cs0 ((1 + FK0(1− θs0)as0)
= −FL0²s, (37)
and the redistributive Þrst-order condition is
Vcs0 − η1−sUcs0cs0 ((1 + FK0(1− θs0)as0)
Vcs+10
− η2−sUcs+10 cs+10
³
(1 + FK0(1− θs+1,t)as+10
´ = βωs+1
ωs
. (38)
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This redistributive condition does not appear in the competitive equilibrium
Þrst-order conditions, but it is very useful to derive the optimal capital taxes.
Updating (36) one period and substituting in (34) we obtain
Vcit = βVci+1t+1
(1− δ + FKt+1) ∀i, t, (39)
This new expression is very similar to a life-cycle Euler equation, but instead of
having the marginal utility with respect to consumption it has the derivative of
V (·).
To derive the optimal tax policy π∗ we combine the Þrst-order conditions of the
Ramsey Allocation Problem together with the competitive equilibrium Þrst-order
conditions. The resulting expression is the optimal capital tax rate
θ∗t+1 =
1
βrt+1
 Vcit
Vci+1t+1
−
Ucit
Uci+1t+1
 ∀i, t. (40)
We use the same procedure to determine the expression for the optimal labor
tax rate
τ∗t = 1−
Ucit
U`it
V`it
Vcit
∀i, t. (41)
It is important to remark that we are solving a relaxed version of the Ramsey
problem, hence we cannot expect that taxes on capital returns are zero unless
two conditions are satisÞed: Þrst, the ratio Vcit/Vci+1t+1
is equal to the solution
of the competitive equilibrium Ucit/Uci+1t+1
, and second, the additional constraints
on marginal utilities are also satisÞed. Hence in these type of economies the
optimal capital tax is aﬀected by the distortions in the labor market implied by
the restrictions on the set of taxes π.
If we drop the age subscripts from the Þrst-order conditions of the Ramsey
problem, the associated expression for the optimal tax policy is equal to the
one obtained in an inÞnite-lived consumer economy. Chamley (1986) proves two
important results. First, for a general class of utility functions capital taxes should
be zero in the long run (consumption is constant, therefore Uct = Uct+1). Second,
for a particular class of functions, that satisfy Vct/Vct+1 = Uct/Uct+1 , the optimal
capital income taxes are zero after a Þnite number of periods. The conditions for
the zero capital result in the transition path are generally viewed as an application
of the uniform commodity taxation principle (see Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980)),
that speciÞes conditions under which taxing all goods at the same rate is optimal.
In overlapping generations economies the previous results are not generally
true. The next proposition provides suﬃcient conditions that preferences need to
satisfy for the zero capital income tax result.
Proposition 2: If the government has access to proportional distortionary taxes
across agents, then taxes on capital income are zero for t ≥ 2 if preferences satisfy:
θt = 0⇒
citUccit + `
i
tU`cit
Ucit
=
`itU``it + c
i
tUc`it
U`it
∀t > 1 (42)
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Proof. We need to show that if preferences satisfy this property, then the solution
of the less constrained Ramsey problem is also a solution to the more constrained
problem and capital income taxes are zero from t ≥ 2. We can rewrite condition
(42) as follows
citUccit
+ `itU`cit = AUcit , (43)
`U`` + c
i
tUc`it
= AU`it . (44)
Now lets consider the Þrst-order conditions of the Ramsey problem with respect
to cit
(1 + ηt−i)Ucit + ηt−i
h
citUccit
+ `itU`cit
i
= αt,
where ηt and αt denote the Lagrange multipliers of the implementability constraint
of a generation born at period t and the period resource constraint respectively.
Substituting Equation (43) in the Þrst order conditions, we can rewrite the Þrst-
order conditions as
Ucit(1 + ηt−i(1 +A)) = αt, (45)
since this equations holds for time t and t+ 1, then we can derive
Ucit
Uci+1t+1
= 1 + FKt − δ.
This condition is suﬃcient to ensure zero capital taxes in an inÞnitely-lived
consumers model, but is these type of economies it does not guarantee that the
additional constraints are satisÞed. Now we want to show that condition (43)
together with condition (44) are suﬃcient to ensure that the solution of the less
constrained problem is a solution of the more constrained problem. Using the
same argument, consider the Þrst-order conditions of the Ramsey problem with
respect to `it,
(1 + ηt−i)U`it + ηt−i
h
`U`` + c
i
tUc`it
i
= −αtFLt²i
substituting (44) we have
U`it
(1 + ηt−i(1 +A)) = −αtFLt²i. (46)
Since Equation (46) holds for all generations at a given period t, then the marginal
rates of substitution between consumption and labor are equal across generations.
At the initial period t = 1, capital and labor taxes are diﬀerent from zero
because the implementability constraints of the initial generations include the
initial distribution of capital stock,
θ1 =
1
β(FK1 − δ)
(1 + ηs)Ucs0 + ηs−i
³
cstUcst cst + `
s
tU`st cst
´
− η1−sUcs0cs0as0
(1 + ηs)Ucs+11
+ ηs−i
³
cs+1t+1Uccs+1t+1
+ `stU`cs+1t+1
´ − Ucs0
Ucs+11
 ,
(47)
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where η1−sUcs0cs0a
s
0 prevents capital taxes from being zero. At t = 0 the initial
capital taxes are given, θ0.
The class of utility functions that satisÞes this property are of the form
U(c, `) =W (G(c, `))
where c = (c1, ..., cI), ` = (`1, ..., `I) and G is homothetic with respect to both
arguments consumption and labor (G1 > 0, G11 < 0, G2 < 0 and G22 < 0). An
example of this class of preferences is given by
U(c, `) =
(c`−γ)1−σ
1− σ
where γ ∈ (0, 1) and σ ≥ 1+γγ . Under this class of preferences the optimal policy
implies set all taxes equal to zero. The optimal plan involves collecting tax rev-
enues in excess in the initial periods, then with these claims against the private
sector the government Þnances government expenditure with the interest earnings
on government capital, after setting all taxes equal to zero. From the government
budget constraint in steady state,
G ≤ τwL+ θrK + (1−R)B
given that τ = θ = 0 and R = λ−1, hence B < 0. In this case there is nothing
special about the Þnite-horizon of the individuals. With the additional conditions
on the cross derivatives with respect to labor, the optimal tax on labor income
for an inÞnitely-lived consumer is also zero.
At this point it is important to mention that standard preferences commonly
used in the macro and public Þnance literature like
U(c, `) =
c1−σ
1− σ − v(`) (48)
or
U(c, `) =
(cγ(1− `)1−γ)1−σ
1− σ (49)
do not satisfy the suﬃcient condition. Therefore, in these cases the optimal tax
on capital income is diﬀerent from zero even though the preferences satisfy the
uniform commodity tax property. It is important to remark that ` denotes la-
bor and not leisure. If we redeÞne the objective function then the associated
implementability constraint has to include (1− `)U` instead of `U`.
This result improves the existing literature in two ways. First, it considers a
general model where individuals live I periods, and second it analyzes the optimal
policy on the transition path. The analysis of the tax policy in two period OLG
economies ignores the additional constraints, and in a more general framework the
conditions for zero capital tax are much more restrictive. This result contrasts
with the class of models with inÞnitely-lived consumers where the optimal capital
tax generally converges to zero after a Þnite number of periods.
Then why is the uniform commodity tax result not suﬃcient to guarantee zero
capital taxes in this class of model? The answer is intergenerational heterogeneity.
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This factor plays an important role in this result, because the government faces
additional constraints if taxes have to be equal across generations at each period
t, (i.e. marginal rates of substitution need to be equal across consumers). In
this case the solution of the less constrained problem is not a solution to the
more constrained problem. This is not true in an economy with heterogeneous
inÞnitely-lived consumers. Chari and Kehoe (1999) show that the additional
constraints are satisÞed if the production function F (·) has the form F (K,L) =
F (K,H(L)), where H(·) is some function. In an overlapping generations economy
this argument does not apply because the properties of the zero capital tax result
depend on U(·) and not on F (·). In the numerical simulations it will be clear that
these additional constraints have important quantitative eﬀects.
In general taxes on capital returns are diﬀerent from zero unless we make some
assumption either on the lifetime horizon or on the set of instruments available to
the government. The next proposition states that the additional set of constraints
play a crucial role to determine the optimal Þscal policy in this type of economies.
Proposition 3: In this environment the uniform commodity tax result is a suf-
Þcient condition to ensure zero capital taxes if:
1) The government has access to age-dependent taxes, or
2) I=2 and the old generation does not supply labor.
Proof. If the government can use age-speciÞc taxes the Ramsey allocation drops
the additional constraints, therefore the optimal policy for utility functions of the
form (48) and (49) imply zero capital taxes from period two onwards. In this case
labor taxes are diﬀerent from zero. Equivalently in a two period OLG economy
where the old generation does not supply labor, the government problem does not
include additional constraints. The young generation supplies labor in the market
while the old generation supplies capital.
In a diﬀerent environment the previous result might not be true. Consider
a standard two period OLG model but suppose the young generations have an
endowment, mt, which is not taxed at all. This is almost equivalent to considering
an exogenously Þxed labor supply. Then, the new implementability for a newborn
generation is
c1tUc1t + `
1
tU`1t + βc
2
t+1Uc2t+1
= mtUc1t
Then even if preferences satisfy the uniform commodity taxation property,
the Ramsey taxes on c1t and c
2
t+1 are not uniform, that implies capital taxes
diﬀerent from zero. The previous example is useful because it highlights the
relation between taxes on consumption and capital, and gives some of the intuition
of why it might be optimal to tax capital. In an overlapping generations model,
the distortions associated with this policy are not that important because for a
given generation todays consumption and period T consumption are not perfectly
substitutable. Hence the eﬀect of capital distortions is much smaller and not
necessarily bigger than distortions caused by other taxes like labor income taxes.
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This model predicts that in general taxes on capital returns are diﬀerent from
zero. In the next section I explore if the model can account for the observed taxes
for the US economy for some plausible parameter values.
4 Quantitative Results
4.1 Calibration
This section describes the choice of the functional forms for the numerical simu-
lations and the calibration process. The utility function is a standard CRRA
U(c, `) =
¡
cγ(1− `)1−γ¢1−σ − 1
1− σ
where γ ∈ (0, 1) is the consumption share in the utility function and σ denotes
the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. In the benchmark econ-
omy σ is set equal to 1 as in Chari and Kehoe (1999), that is a logarithmic
utility function. This utility function does not satisfy the suﬃcient conditions for
zero capital taxes if individuals live more than two periods. The technology is a
constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas production function
F (K,N) = KαN1−α
Given these functional forms the parameters in the model have been calibrated
so that the steady state of the competitive equilibrium matches selected aggregates
of US economy.
For computational simplicity it is assumed that a period in the economy is 6
years, and agents live up to 10 periods. Therefore, the model can be interpreted
as one in which individuals are born economically at age 20 and live up to 74
years. This assumption does not aﬀect the quantitative results. In this economy
there is no mandatory retirement and without loss of generality it is assumed that
population growth is zero.
The empirical evidence shows that hours worked are not constant over the life-
cycle. Ghez and Becker (1975) and Juster and Staﬀord (1991) Þnd that households
allocate one third of their discretionary time in market activities. Setting γ =
0.4 in the model implies that individuals work an average of 33% of their time
endowment over the life-cycle.
The discount factor β is chosen together with the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution to match the observed capital-output ratio of the economy. Given
that in the benchmark economy σ = 1, setting β = 0.99 matches the observed
average capital-output ratio of 2.4.
In the technology, the capital share is set α = 0.33. The depreciation rate is
set to δ = 0.08 to match the observed average investment-output ratio of 16.1%.
The capital-output ratio together with the depreciation rate imply a gross interest
rate of 5.6%. The preferences and technology parameters are displayed in the next
table:
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Table 1: Preferences and technology parameters
β γ σ α δ
0.99 0.4 1.0 0.33 0.08
The labor earnings age proÞle {²j} is derived using PSID data. In the model,
labor services are homogeneous, so there is a single wage per eﬃciency unit of
labor. Hence, {²j} is chosen to match the age proÞle of average wages in the
cross-section of US data.
The government consumption is set to 19%, which corresponds to the average
of the last decade. In determining taxation on factor earnings and consumption I
follow the methodology of Mendoza, Tesar and Razin (1994). They develop con-
sistent measures of the eﬀective tax rate on factors income for OECD countries.
The competitive economy is calibrated using the average tax rates since 1965.
These taxes are reported in table 2:
Table 2: Eﬀective tax rates
θ τ c τ l
35% 5% 24%
Therefore the net of taxes interest rate is 3.6%. In steady state if the level of
debt is positive, that implies that the government must have a surplus. Given
G/Y and the tax policy π, the ratio D/Y is endogenously determined in the
model according. The resulting debt-output ratio in the competitive economy is
24%. This Þgure is roughly consistent with the average observed in the data since
1965, which is 23%.
A feature of this model is that if the economy converges to the steady state,
then it has the modiÞed golden rule property and it is independent of the initial
conditions a0 (see Escolano (1992)).
In the next subsections I quantify the optimal Þscal policy in the long run
when the government only has access to proportional taxes across ages and age-
independent proportional taxes. The numerical simulations are accompanied by
a sensitivity analysis with respect to the parameter values that play an important
role in the determination of the optimal policy.
4.2 Proportional taxes
In this section I quantify the optimal Þscal policy in the long run when the gov-
ernment only has access to proportional taxes. In the Ramsey allocation problem,
the relative weight that the government places between present and future genera-
tions has no counterpart in the competitive economy. Determining this parameter
is somehow arbitrary, and the results as we will see are very sensitive to changes
in the speciÞed value. I choose this parameter so that the capital-output ratio
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associated with the optimal policy coincides with the competitive economy. That
implies setting λ = 0.947.
A summary of the results obtained for the case where the government is re-
stricted to use proportional taxes across consumers in presented in table 3.
Table 3: Optimal policy with proportional taxes
Benchmark Optimal Policy
Capital tax 35.0% 40.8%
Labor tax 24.0% 21.4%
Net interest rate 3.6% 3.3%
Debt/GDP 24.4% 8.7%
There are several important quantitative features of the solution. First, the
calibrated model can account for the observed Þscal policy for some plausible
choice of parameter values. The optimal capital income tax is 40.8% and the
optimal labor income tax is 21.4%. Both values are consistent with the observed
time-series, a 35% capital income tax and a 24% labor income tax. Given that
the capital-output ratio is the same in both economies, the gross relative prices
are also the same but the after tax prices are diﬀerent. Second, the optimal ratio
debt-GDP is smaller than the average value in the data. This lower value reduces
the government need of having an important surplus.
The optimal policy and its eﬀect on the after tax relative prices aﬀect house-
holds decisions. The reduction of labor taxes and the increase of the net wage
rates reduces the fraction of time supplied by young generations in the labor mar-
ket. The lower net interest rate (after tax and net of depreciation) allows young
generations to borrow more resources and is a disincentive for the old generations
to accumulate capital.
In the benchmark calibration there are two parameters that could have a
large impact on the optimal Þscal policy: the government discount rate and the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution. First, all these calculations are done
assuming that the capital-output ratio associated to the optimal policy coincides
with the competitive equilibrium of the benchmark economy. There is no reason to
believe that changes in the Þscal policy will not aﬀect this relationship. Second,
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution might play a role to determine the
distortions of capital taxes in consumption. To test the sensitivity of these results
to the choice of parameter, I performed several additional computations with
diﬀerent parameter choices. The next table describes the eﬀects of varying the
government discount rate (λ = 0.947 for the benchmark economy):
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Table 4: Changes in the government discount rate
λ Capital tax Labor tax Int. rate Net int. rate Debt/GDP Capital/GDP
0.93 58.1% 17.9% 7.6% 3.1% 18.1% 2.2
0.94 49.2% 19.8% 6.4% 3.2% 12.8% 2.3
0.95 36.6% 22.1% 5.3% 3.3% 6.8% 2.5
0.96 17.7% 24.7% 4.1% 3.4% -0.3% 2.7
0.97 0.3% 19.3% 3.1% 3.1% -30.1% 3.0
0.98 -6.5% 10.4% 2.0% 2.2% -91.5% 3.3
Changes in the government discount rate have redistributive eﬀects in this
economy because it changes the relative weight that the government places be-
tween present and future generations. If the government increases λ it lowers the
gross interest rate of the economy in steady state given by
1
λ
= 1 + FK − δ. (50)
From table 4 the following facts can be summarized. First, the optimal tax on
capital returns is inversely related with the government discount factor. Keeping
Þxed individual discount rate, β, if the government increases λ ( that means
discounts less and it values more future generations) lowers the gross interest rate
of the economy in steady state by increasing the capital-output ratio. For some
parameter value, λ = 0.97, the optimal capital income tax is roughly zero, and
for higher values negative. This result is consistent with the numerical Þndings of
Escolano (1992), for a diﬀerent class of preferences. Changes in the government
discount factor have a smaller eﬀect on the optimal labor taxes. The optimal level
of debt is also inversely related with λ. The decrease of revenues is compensated
by a decrease of the level of debt.
The next table summarizes the eﬀects of changes in the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution (σ) :
Table 5: Changes in the elasticity of substitution
σ Capital tax Labor tax Net int. rate Debt/GDP
1.0 40.8% 21.8% 3.3% 8.7%
1.5 23.0% 27.0% 4.3% 9.5%
2.0 8.9% 27.9% 5.1% 2.6%
2.5 3.4% 22.2% 5.4% -9.7%
3.0 -1.2% 17.7% 5.6% -18.8%
4.0 -6.9% 10.2% 6.0% -32.2%
As in the previous case, changes in the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
have important eﬀects on the optimal Þscal policy. The optimal capital income
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tax is highly sensitive to assumptions about the intertemporal elasticity of sub-
stitution. Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987) use 1.5, and some other authors in envi-
ronments with uncertainty have used values around 2. The optimal tax on capital
returns is zero only for a special parametrization of the model economy, in this
case when σ ∈ (2.5, 3.0). The optimal labor tax is not very sensitive to variations
in this parameter because the consumption and labor decisions are not aﬀected
by σ. In general, a lower taxation is compensated with a lower debt-output ratio.
To summarize, if the government uses proportional taxes across ages, the
optimal capital tax is consistent with the observed tax for the US economy. The
optimal Þscal policy is very sensitive to variations of the government discount rate
and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. The calibrated model can account
for the observed capital taxes for some plausible choice of parameter values. The
conditions for zero capital taxes in steady state are much more restrictive that in
the inÞnitely-lived agent model. In the next section we study the optimal policy
when the government has access to age-dependent proportional taxes.
4.3 Age-dependent taxes
This section studies from a quantitative point of view the optimal Þscal policy
with an unrestricted set of Þscal instruments. Now the government can choose
age-dependent proportional taxes. Formally that implies dropping the additional
constraints on the marginal rates of substitution in the government problem. Next
Þgure presents a summary of the numerical results for the optimal policy in the
benchmark economy:
[Insert Figure 1]
We can summarize these characteristics as follows. First, for the benchmark
case (σ = 1), the age-speciÞc capital tax is constant across households and equal
to zero. This result is consistent with Proposition 3, this type of utility function
satisÞes the suﬃcient conditions for zero capital taxes if the government can use
age-speciÞc taxes.8 Second, the age speciÞc labor income taxes are large and
diﬀer across households. For this particular parametrization labor taxes are the
only source of revenues to Þnance government expenditure. The ratio debt-GDP
associated to the optimal policy is 45.1%, almost double than the average observed
in the data from 1965-1996.
As in the previous section, the quantitative analysis is accompanied by a sensi-
tivity analysis with respect to the government discount rate and the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution. Variations of the government discount rate, λ, do not
aﬀect the optimal tax on capital returns as long as the utility function satisÞes
the suﬃcient conditions. Hence, this result is independent of the relative weight
that the government places on present and future generations. Changes in the
discount rate aﬀect the interest rate in steady state, the higher is λ, the higher
8In this case the additional conditions that restrict the marginal rates of substitution between
consumption today and tomorrow are not binding. In order to satisfy the suﬃcient conditions
for zero capital taxation we must allow labor taxes to diﬀer across agents.
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are wages in the economy. Therefore at a higher wage the Þnancial needs of the
government can be satisÞed with a lower labor income tax. The level of debt is
adjusted to satisfy the desired capital-output ratio. For a higher values of the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution the optimal capital tax across generations
is diﬀerent from zero. Figure 2 displays the optimal age-speciÞc taxes for diﬀerent
values of σ.
[Insert Figure 2]
Summarizing the eﬀects of changes in intertemporal elasticity of substitu-
tion. First, the distribution of capital taxes diﬀers over the life cycle. For the
parametrized version of the model, if the government can use a complete set of
instruments, then the age proÞle capital tax pattern implies subsidizing asset re-
turns of the young generations in the economy and taxing at high rates the asset
returns of old generations. Changes in the elasticity of substitution do not aﬀect
the average capital income tax over the life cycle, which is zero. Second, notice
that an increase in σ does not substantially aﬀect the distribution of capital taxes
across generations, but it lowers the labor-speciÞc taxes for all ages.. Finally, both
labor income taxes and the ratio debt-output are decreasing in σ. For σ = 1.5,
the debt-output ratio is 23.1% and for σ = 2 only 3.9%. For higher values of σ,
this ratio is negative.
5 Conclusions
This paper provides, from a theoretical and quantitative point of view, an expla-
nation of why the observed taxes on capital returns are larger than what standard
theory predicts, not taxing capital at all. Using a stylized economy with inter-
generational redistribution, I derive a suﬃcient condition to check whether the
optimal policy implies zero capital taxes, and I show that commonly used utility
functions in the macro and public Þnance literature violate this condition. There-
fore, when heterogeneity is due to an intergenerational factor, we should expect
taxes on capital returns to be diﬀerent from zero. For a version of the model,
calibrated to the US economy, the main results are: Þrst, if the government is
restricted to use proportional taxes across generations, the model can account for
the observed capital and labor income taxes. Second, if the government can use
speciÞc taxes for each generation, then the age proÞle capital tax pattern implies
subsidizing asset returns of the younger generations and taxing at higher rates
the asset returns of the older ones.
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Figure 1: Capital and labor age-dependent taxes
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Figure 2: Sensitivity analysis
Case σ = 2
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Case σ = 3
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